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A comparison of catching-up premium rate models
This paper discusses and compares two models for the catching-up premium rate, a partial
adjustment (PA) model and a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) model. The models are different
in that the PA model is a solution to a static optimisation problem, while the optimisation
problem in the LQR model is dynamic. With respect to the economic principle of premium
smoothing, it turns out that the LQR model is the preferable model. In addition, the simulation
outcomes of this model are more consistent with the institutions of the Dutch pension system.Contents
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11 Introduction
The total pension premium rate consists of two components, the contribution rate and the
catching-up premium rate. The contribution rate ﬁnances the accrual of pension rights while the
catching-up premium ﬁnances (possible) wealth deﬁcits of a pension fund. The contribution rate
and the catching-up premium rate have a different effect on the economy. From an economic
point of view, the contribution rate can be interpreted as delayed income needed to ﬁnance the
period after retirement. In that sense, pension accrual payments are savings which do not have
negative effects on the economy, as they do not distort individual labour supply decisions.
Catching-up payments however, can be considered as distorting taxes that affect labour
supply. These payments do not yield direct beneﬁts to an employer and employee.
Consequently, an employer could decide to demand less labour while an employee may reduce
its amount of labour supply, ultimately resulting in lower employment and production. Similar to
the economic principles regarding normal taxation, the distorting effect of catching-up payments
can be minimized by smoothing these payments over time.
In this paper the contribution rate is assumed to be exogenous and the main focus is on the
catching-up premium rate. We will compare two models for the catching-up premium rate, a
partial adjustment model (PA) and a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) model. Special attention
will be given to the ability of the models to smooth premium payments over time. In both
models the premium rule is an optimal solution to a minimisation problem. The models are
different in that the PA model faces a static optimisation problem while in the LQR model this
minimisation problem is dynamic. That means, the pension fund takes the future situation into
account when it determines the present premium rate.
The models will be compared in two ways. First, we investigate the short-term effects of a
shock to the pension system using a simple partial derivative analysis. Throughout this paper we
are concerned with two sort of shocks: shocks that affect the effective rate of return of a pension
fund (like a stock market crash) and shocks that affect the growth rate of pension rights (like a
change in survival probabilities). Second, we will compare the transition effects of a shock in
both models using a graphical impulse response analysis.
We ﬁnd that the forward looking LQR model is preferable over the static PA model. Due to
its forward looking character this model better smoothes catching-up payments over time. In the
PA model, a shock to the pension system is largely absorbed by short-lived premium rate
changes. In addition, it turns out the outcomes of the LQR model are more consistent with the
institutions of the Dutch pension system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the PA model and the LQR
2model. Section 3 describes the partial derivative analysis and section 4 presents the impulse
response analysis. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling the catching-up premium
In both the PA model and the LQR model the catching-up premium rate is an optimal solution to
a loss function, although the speciﬁcation of this function differs between the models. Consistent
with the instructions of the Dutch pension supervisor, the Pensioen- en Verzekeringskamer
(PVK), the models impose that the funding ratio converges to a target value. The PVK
prescribes that a pension fund whose funding ratio is lower than the required level, must reduce
its deﬁcit within a period of at most ﬁfteen years.1 Before we discuss the models in detail, we
ﬁrst introduce some deﬁnitions that are frequently used in this paper.
2.1 Deﬁnitions
We assume that the funding ratio (D) and the asset holdings of the pension fund (W) are






Wt = (1+rt)Wt−1+ςtGt +τtGt −Bt (2.2)
where R are pension liabilities, G is the premium base, B pension beneﬁts, r the effective rate of
return to pension wealth, ς the contribution rate and, ﬁnally, τ the catching-up premium rate. We




σt , ψt > 0, 0 < σt 5 1 (2.3)
with g the growth rate of pension liabilities due to factors like, for example, population growth
and ψ is the indexation factor with respect to wages and prices. We allow for indexation
discounts since 0 < σ 5 1. Combining equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) we rewrite the law of
motion of the funding ratio as follows,
Dt = (1+kt)Dt−1+Pt +At (2.4)
1 For a detailed overview of the most recent solvency instructions of the Dutch pension supervisor, see PVK (2004).
3where k is the effective rate of return in terms of the funding ratio, P the catching-up premium















2.2 Partial adjustment (PA) model
The general objective of a catching-up premium model is to smoothly close the gap between the
current value of the funding ratio and its required level. The PA model considered here is an
optimal solution to a loss function that imposes costs to ﬂuctuations in both the funding ratio and
the premium rate. Let us suppose that this loss function is quadratic and has the following form
L(t) = (Dt (τt)−D∗)
2+λ (Dt (τt)−Dt−1)
2+θ (Pt (τt)−Pt−1)
2, λ > 0, θ > 0 (2.6)
where D∗ is the required level of the funding ratio and assumed to be exogenous in this paper. To
ensure that the funding ratio converges to this target value, equation (2.6) penalizes deviations
from this target level. The second right-hand side term of (2.6) is the cost term associated with
funding ratio ﬂuctuations and reﬂects the institutional requirements imposed upon a pension
fund. The weight that the fund (or implicitely, the pension authority) assigns to this term is
constant and equal to λ. The third term of (2.6) represents the costs the pension fund assigns to
year-to-year premium rate ﬂuctuations. We thus assume that a pension fund realises that large
premium rate ﬂuctuations are welfare reducing for its participants. The weight that is assigned to
this component is θ and is also time-invariant. Note that (2.6) is a static minimisation problem
so that the fund does not take the future economic situation into account. From the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to the catching-up premium we derive,
Dt −D∗+λ (Dt −Dt−1)+θ (Pt −Pt−1) = 0 (2.7)












Equation (2.8) is the policy rule of the pension fund. This function is a weighted average of the
target value of the funding ratio, the previous year’s funding ratio, the autonomous part of the
funding ratio and the lagged catching-up premium rate. As we may expect, the premium rate is
4increasing in the target funding ratio and decreasing in the autonomous development of the
funding ratio. The intention of the fund to smooth the catching-up payments over time, is
reﬂected by the lagged premium rate in the last term of (2.8).
The loss function is minimised if the funding ratio is constant and equal to its target value
(Dt = Dt−1 = D∗) and the premium receipts do not change anymore (Pt = Pt−1). Then the





So, in the long run the catching-up premium only depends on the wealth return (ktD∗) and the
autonomous development of the funding rate. In the hypothetical case in which the contribution
rate is cost-effective and the effective rate of return is equal to the discount factor of pension
rights, we have At = −ktD∗ and consequently, the catching-up premium will be equal to zero.
The premium rate of equation (2.8) is a second-order difference equation. This can be shown by




[(2θ +ktθ +λ)Pt−1−θ (1+kt)Pt−2−λ (At −At−1)−ktD∗] (2.10)
In order to ensure that the funding ratio attains its required level, equation (2.10) requires that the
premium rate must be stable in the long run. Stability implies that the long-run behaviour of the
premium rate does not depend on initial conditions regarding ﬁnancial wealth. Stability puts the





Besides the requirement of stability, there is more to care about. In general, a second-order
difference equation can display oscillations, depending on whether the characteristic equation
has complex roots or not. However, an oscillating premium rate is not compatible with the
objective of the pension fund considered in this model. The pension fund tends to smooth
catching-up payments, because it is generally assumed that this minimises the distorting effect of
these payments on labour supply decision of its participants. To prevent that the characteristic
equation of (2.10) has complex roots, a second condition is imposed upon λ and θ,
(2θ +ktθ +λ)
2 > 4θ (1+kt)(1+λ +θ) (2.12)
Note that equation (2.12) is always satisﬁed if no cost is imposed upon premium rate ﬂuctuations
(θ = 0).
2 A solution to a second-order difference equation is stable if and only if the modulus of each root of the characteristic
equation is less than one. In terms of the coefﬁcients in the equation xt +ϕ1xt−1 +ϕ2xt−2 = ct, stability implies that
ϕ2 < 1 and |ϕ1| < 1+ϕ2. In our case we can omit the second condition because it can be shown that this condition
implies θ (1+kt)−1 < θ (1+kt), which is always satisﬁed because it is assumed that θ > 0 and 1+kt > 0.

















To illustrate the oscillating behaviour of equation (2.10), ﬁgure 2.1 shows the premium rate for
different values of θ. For simplicity we only impose costs to premium rate ﬂuctuations, that is,
we set λ = 0 in equation (2.6). This restriction implies for the stability condition (2.11) and real













Note that the right-hand side of inequality (2.13b) is strictly larger than the right-hand side of
(2.13a). Therefore, the premium rate converges if and only if it contains oscillations. This is
exactly what we observe in ﬁgure 2.1. When θ is low (high) the rate of convergence is high
(low) and the oscillations are less (more) pronounced. Because we assume that k = 0.019, the
premium rate does not converge anymore if θ exceeds the value of 50.3 In addition, if θ is larger
than about 104, the premium rate is free from oscillations and becomes an exponential function.
3 In section 4 we will discuss the calibration of the parameters.
62.3 Linear quadratic regulator (LQR) model
In the PA model the determination of the catching-up premium rate is a static decision. In the
LQR model we relax this assumption and assume that the pension fund takes account of the
future economic situation at the time the current premium rate is determined.
The general idea of the LQR model is to a large extent identical to the PA model. That
means, the LQR model minimises a quadratic loss function subject to a linear transition
function. Solving the Bellman equation of the loss function gives an optimal policy rule for the
control variable as a linear function of the state variable. In the loss function, there is one state
variable, the funding ratio, and one control variable, the catching-up premium.4 We will not use
levels of the funding ratio and catching-up premium rate in the loss function, though, but
deviations of these variables from their long-term values.
In the long run the funding ratio has to be equal to its target value (Dt = D∗) and for the
long-term catching-up premium we have,
P = −A−kD∗ (2.14)
where a bar above a variable denotes the equilibrium value which is assumed to be constant in
the long run. The state variable (X) and control variable (U) can be written as,
Xt ≡ Dt −D∗ = (1+kt)Xt−1+Ut +Zt (2.15)
Ut ≡ Pt −P = Pt +At +kD∗ (2.16)
with Zt ≡ D∗ 
kt −k

. Since equation (2.16) is deﬁned in deviation from the long-run premium
rate, shocks to k do not directly enter the control variable. Suppose, the representative pension













, ρ > 0, λ > 0, θ > 0 (2.17)
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference and θ = π/(1+ρ) is the discounted version of the
cost parameter π. The pension fund assigns costs to deviations of the funding ratio and premium
rate from their long-run values with, respectively, weight λ and θ. For convenience, we use the
same symbols for the cost parameters as in the PA model although their interpretation is slightly
different.
From (2.17) we observe that the pension fund is not only concerned with the present
situation, but also discounts future deviations of the state and control variable. In addition, the
4 For a description of the general deterministic and stochastic LQR model in matrix notation, we refer to, respectively,
chapter 4 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and chapter 2 of Heer and Maussner (2005).
7observed loss in period t depends on the current state and the (expectation of the) one period
ahead control instead of the current control.5 The reason for this is that the value of the current
control is already captured by the current state, see equation (2.16).
Now the idea of the LQR model is the following. Given the law of motion of equation (2.15),
the pension fund chooses the sequence {Ut}
¥
t=0 in such a way that the loss function becomes





















Equation (2.18) has a lot of similarities with the PA premium rule. The catching-up premium
rate negatively depends on the previous year’s funding ratio and the autonomous accumulation
of ﬁnancial wealth, and positively on the target value of the funding ratio. Note that the lagged
premium rate does not enter equation (2.18). Consequently, the LQR premium rate is not subject
to oscillations.
The forward looking character of the LQR premium rate is captured by the time dependent
coefﬁcients α and β. As derived in appendix A, these coefﬁcients are functions of the one period
ahead effective rate of return. That is,

















In appendix A we also show under which condition β approaches zero in the long run. If this
condition is met, the funding ratio will reach its target value and equation (2.18) will reduce to
its equilibrium value given by equation (2.14).



























5 We assume that agents have perfect foresight and therefore exactly know future values of the premium rate. This
assumption is consistent with the GAMMA model.
8The time preference rate (ρ) and the cost parameters (λ and θ) together determine the rate of
convergence of the state variable (X) and the control variable (U). Figure 2.2 shows the
sensitivity of the control variable (left panel) and state variable (right panel) to changes in one of
these parameters. In the base situation λ and θ are set to 0.1 and ρ to 3.
Consider ﬁrst an increase of ρ to 9. From the left panel of ﬁgure 2.2 we see that the control
variable initially drops down relative to the base situation and then more gradually declines
towards zero. Consequently, the convergence rate of the state variable also declines and it takes
more time until the funding ratio has converged to its equilibrium level (see the right panel of
ﬁgure 2.2. The interpretation is as follows. When ρ increases, the (short-sighted) pension fund
shifts the premium burden needed to reduce the wealth deﬁcit to the future.
Increasing the parameter λ leads to the opposite effect. Recall that a higher value of λ places
more costs to deviations of the funding ratio from its equilibrium value. Therefore, when λ
increases, the rate of convergence of the funding ratio increases, but this does not occur costless.
Relative to the base situation, the control variable increases at impact and then quickly declines
towards zero.
The effect of an increase in θ actually leads to the same conclusions as a rise in ρ. If θ is
large, the pension fund imposes much costs to deviations of the premium rate from its
equilibrium value. As a consequence, the level of the control variable ut initially drops down as
the convergence rate of the funding ratio does.
3 Comparing the models
In this section the PA model and the LQR model are compared. We will investigate how
different shocks affect the funding ratio and premium rate in the shock period. In the next
section we will discuss the transition effects. We focus on two types of shocks, a shock to the
asset holdings of a pension fund and a shock to its liabilities. We will also consider the role of
cutting down indexation promises. It is assumed that the shocks occur before the catching-up
premium rate has been ﬁxed.
3.1 Shock to asset holdings
A shock to the asset holdings of a pension fund can take different forms, like for example an
asset market crash or an employer’s contribution. In this paper asset shocks have in common that
they affect the effective rate of return (r). To analyse the effect of such a shock on the funding
ratio and premium rate, we simply compute the corresponding partial derivatives with respect to











Dt−1 < 0 (3.20)
which is strictly negative as intuitively expected. If the portfolio return declines (increases), the
pension fund has to increase (decrease) the premium rate in order to bring the funding ratio in
the direction of its required level. Equation (3.20) is increasing in θ. Recall that θ determines
the costs that are imposed upon premium rate ﬂuctuations. When this cost is high, the increase
(decline) of the premium rate in reaction to a negative (positive) asset shock is low.
It is important to know how the impulse of the rate of return inﬂuences the funding ratio.
Substituting equation (2.8) in the law of motion of the funding ratio (2.4) and taking the partial








Dt−1 = 0 (3.21)
Let us ﬁrst analyse the two most extreme situations, i.e., in which no cost is placed upon
premium rate ﬂuctuations (θ = 0) or to funding ratio ﬂuctuations (λ = 0). If there are no costs
associated with premium rate movements, this rate will be adjusted immediately after a shock
and there will be no effect on the funding ratio. Of course, this result is not incompatible with
the instructions of the PVK, but is is far from realistic. In many practical situations a shock will
affect the funding ratio like, for example, an employer’s contribution with the intention to
improve the funding ratio. Imposing no costs upon funding ratio ﬂuctuations is also not very
realistic. From equation (3.21) we observe that for λ = 0 the change of the funding ratio after a
shock is maximal. However, in reality it is not reasonable that the funding ratio behaves as a
jump variable. We therefore only consider the situation in which both λ > 0 and θ > 0.
Penalizing both premium rate and funding ratio ﬂuctuations brings the PA model closer to
reality. If λ > 0 and θ > 0, equation (3.20) is strictly negative and equation (3.21) strictly
positive. This implies that a positive (negative) shock to asset holdings induces both the
premium rate to decrease (increase) and the funding ratio to increase (decrease).
For the LQR model, the partial derivatives of the premium rate and funding ratio with respect


















σt Dt−1 > 0 (3.23)
The behaviour of the LQR model is quite comparable with the PA model.6 A positive (negative)
asset shock leads to a decline (increase) in the premium rate and to an improvement
6 In equation (3.22) and (3.23), but also in equation (3.25) and (3.27), it is assumed that αt > 0 for all t. In appendix A it is
shown under which condition this assumption holds.
10(deterioration) of the funding ratio. Equation (3.22) and (3.23) are both increasing in θ.
Therefore, imposing a high (low) cost to deviations of the catching-up premium rate from its
equilibrium level leads to a small (large) response of the premium rate and the impact on the
funding ratio is high (low).7
Although the cost parameter λ does not appear in (3.22) and (3.23), from equation (2.19a)
we observe that there is direct positive link between α and λ. Equations (3.22) and (3.23) are
both decreasing in α. Thus, if more costs are assigned to funding ratio deviations (λ increases),
the burden of the shock will shift from the funding ratio to the premium rate.
3.2 Shock to liabilities
Shocks to the liability side of a pension fund also occur in reality. For instance, it is possible that
the full retirement age is increased or that the interest rate by which the liabilities are discounted
changes. At impact, all these shocks affect the growth rate of the liabilities (g). It may be
expected that an increase (decrease) in g ceteris paribus deteriorates (improves) the funding
ratio. To analyse what actually happens in the PA and LQR model, we compute the partial






















σt Dt−1 < 0 (3.25)
where Mt ≡ ζtGt −Ut in (3.24). As intuitively clear, a positive shock to the growth rate of the
liabilities has the same effect as a negative asset shock. That means, if this growth rate increases,
the funding ratio will be negatively affected in both models. In the PA model, we observe that
the burden of the shock shifts to the funding ratio (premium rate) if more weight is given to θ
(λ). The same holds for the LQR model. That is, the response of the funding ratio to a shock is
increasing (decreasing) in θ (λ).
3.3 Effectiveness of indexation discounts
It is important to investigate the effectiveness of cutting down indexation promises in the PA and
LQR model. Usually the pension rights of the participants of a pension fund will be indexed by
the inﬂation and productivity rate. However, a pension fund which is in state of
under-capitalization can use indexation discounts as additional instrument to improve its funding
ratio. Therefore, it is necessarily that cutting down indexation improves the funding ratio in the
7 Note from equation (2.19a) that θ also inﬂuences α, but this effect is rather small.
11models. The discount rate is given by 1−σ. In order to get a positive effect of indexation
discounts on the funding ratio, the partial derivative of Dt with respect to σt must be negative.




















σt Dt−1 < 0 (3.27)
Assuming that the term in square brackets is positive, equation (3.26) is indeed negative. From
equation (3.27) we notice that the same holds for the LQR model. Thus in both models
indexation discounts are effective.
Summarizing, the initial effect of an asset shock and liability shock on the funding ratio and
premium rate are qualitatively quite comparable in both models. That means, a positive asset
shock, or equivalently, a negative liability shock, improves the funding ratio but makes it also
possible to lower the premium rate. In addition, cutting down indexation is an effective
instrument for a pension fund to improve its ﬁnancial situation.
4 Simulations
We emphasize that the analysis above only investigates the initial impact of a shock to the
pension system. In this section we will analyse the transition effects. More speciﬁcally, we will
graphically analyse the effect of an employer’s contribution and a stock market crash. We will
ﬁrst discuss the calibration of the model parameters and show the baseline path of the
catching-up premium rate and funding ratio in both models.
4.1 Data and calibration
For simulation purposes, we need data about the contribution rate (τ), the premium base (G),
pension liabilities (R), pension beneﬁts (B), the effective rate of return (k) and an initial level of
asset holdings (W). We will use artiﬁcial data generated by the dynamic general equilibrium
model GAMMA.8 From these data we deduct the long-term growth rates of the premium base
(h) and of the pension rights (g) and the equilibrium value of the effective rate of return (k). The
full set of calibrated model parameters is presented in table 4.1.
The calibration of the parameters λ, θ and ρ needs some explanation because these
parameters determine the adjustment process of the funding ratio. In the PA model, a high (low)
8 For a description of the GAMMA model, see Draper et al. (2005).
12Table 4.1 Calibration
model dependent parameters PA LQR model independent parameters
λ 12 0.3 ¯ k 0.019
θ 8 0.1 ¯ h 0.035
ω 0.4 - ¯ g 0.035
ρ - 4 ¯ r 0.055
η 10 - D∗ 1.5
λ imposes high (low) costs to year-to-year funding ratio ﬂuctuations so that this ratio converges
slowly (quickly). A low (high) value for θ, the cost parameter associated with premium rate
ﬂuctuations, leads to the same effect. In the LQR model, the adjustment process of the funding
ratio is not only determined by the penalty coefﬁcients λ and θ, but also by the rate of time
preference ρ. A high (low) ρ decreases (increases) the convergence rate of the funding ratio in
the LQR model.
The PVK prescribes that a pension funds with unfunded liabilities must reduce its deﬁcit
within a period of at most ﬁfteen years. For a pension fund that only guarantees a nominal
pension claim, the PVK employs a target funding ratio of 130 percent.9 For the PA model this
requirement is met if λ = 12 and for the LQR model this is satisﬁed for λ = 0.3, θ = 0.1 and
ρ = 4.
The calibration of θ in the PA model is determined by the stability condition (equation
(2.11)) and the real root condition (equation (2.12)). We set θ = 8. With this value the real root
and stability condition is satisﬁed and the adjustment process of the funding rate is consistent
with the instruction of the PVK.
To prevent that the catching-up premium of the PA model becomes unrealistically high,
equation (2.8) is truncated by the following function:










, if τt > 0
τt, if τt 5 0.
(4.1)
where ω is the upper-bound of the total premium rate rate (contribution rate plus catching-up
premium rate) and assumed to be 40 percent. In addition, η is a smoothing parameter which has
a value of 10.
9 In accordance with GAMMA, we set D∗ = 1.5. With this choice we implicitely assume that the pension fund guarantees
a wage indexed pension claim.
























The baseline path of the catching-up premium rate and funding ratio is represented in ﬁgure 4.1.
In the starting position the representative pension fund is in state of considerable
under-capitalization, that is Dt < D∗. We observe that in the ﬁrst forty years the premium rate is
above average, until the funding ratio reaches its target value. In the long run the premium rate
converges to zero.
In the absence of shocks, the similarity of the baseline paths of the PA model and LQR
model is extremely large. Of course, to a large extent this is due to the way the model parameters
are calibrated. In both models the funding ratio equals 130 percent after ﬁfteen years, which is
consistent with the PVK instruction.
4.3 Employer’s contribution
Now we will consider the impact of an employer’s contribution to a pension fund which is in
state of under-capitalization. The employer’s contribution takes place in 2008 and is
implemented by a one-time increase of the effective rate of return from 5.5 percent to 35 percent.
The impact of this shock on the contribution rate and funding ratio is graphically presented in
ﬁgure 4.2. The most striking fact is the enormous decline of the premium rate in the PA model.
A large part of the employer’s contribution is substituted back to the fund participants through
negative premium rates. As a consequence, the funding ratio improves just moderately. The
funding rate increases in 2008 by 14 percent which is 11 percent-points higher than if there was
no shock. After its initial increase in 2008, the funding ratio drops down in 2009 to a level of
118 percent. The reason of this implausible result is connected with the second-order character
of the PA policy rule.
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The improvement of the funding ratio could be increased by declining the cost imposed upon
funding ratio changes (low λ) and/or increasing the penalty imposed upon premium rate
ﬂuctuations (high θ). However, this will increase the possibility of unacceptable oscillations.
In the LQR model the control variable does not directly depend on an employer’s
contribution. Therefore the premium rate just slightly declines and the funding ratio increases
signiﬁcantly. The funding ratio increases with 29 percent in 2008 to a level of 133 percent,
which is 25 percent-points higher than in the absence of an employer’s contribution. After this
initial jump the capitalisation rate gradually converges to its required level of 150 percent.
4.4 Stock market crash
We now consider the effect of a stock market crash. Contrary to the employer’s contribution, we
assume that the pension fund is in equilibrium, that is Dt = D∗. The crash takes place in the year
2115 and reduces the effective rate of return with one percent-point (see ﬁgure 4.3).
At impact the funding ratio decreases in both models. However, the magnitude of the
premium rate changes differs sharply. In the PA model the premium rate rises to about 20
percent while in the LQR model this level is 7 percent. From then on, the PA premium rate
quickly declines and after four years this rate is lower than the gradually declining LQR
premium rate. From ﬁgure 4.3 (left panel) we may conclude that the LQR premium rate does a
better job to smooth distorting catching-up payments. As a consequence, the funding ratio
quicklier attains its target value in the PA model relative to the LQR model.
To illustrate the importance of the maximisation restriction in the PA model, ﬁgure 4.3 also
contains the funding ratio and premium rate paths if equation (4.1) is not imposed. In this
situation the premium rate becomes unrealistically high and the effect of the shock on the
funding ratio is rather limited.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed two types of catching-up premium models, a static partial
adjustment (PA) model and a dynamic linear quadratic regulator (LQR) model. In both models
the catching-up premium is an optimal solution to a quadratic loss function that imposes costs
upon premium and funding ratio ﬂuctuations. The deﬁnition of ﬂuctuations differs between the
models due to the fact that the optimisation problems are not equal. The PA model minimises
year-to-year ﬂuctuations while the LQR model minimises deviations of the control and state
variable from their equilibrium levels.
The models are formally compared using a partial derivative analysis and graphically using
impulse response ﬁgures. For a number of reasons we conclude that the LQR model is
preferable over the PA model. First, due to its forward looking character, the LQR model is a
better tool to smooth catching-up payments over time. Second, the simulation outcomes of the
LQR model are more realistic. For example, in the PA model a stock market crash causes a large
increase in the premium rate. Consequently, the decrease of the funding ratio is too small.
Although this result is not incompatible with the PVK rules, in practice a pension fund will
smooth the effects of a shock over a longer horizon. Also, an employer’s contribution does not
signiﬁcantly improve the funding ratio in the PA model, in contrary to the LQR model. Third,
the PA premium rule is a second-order difference equation which is sensitive to implausible
oscillations. We observe that this sensitivity increases with the penalty imposed upon premium
rate ﬂuctuations. The LQR rule is not susceptible to this problem.
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17Appendix A Derivation of the LQR model













We guess that the solution to the inﬁnite horizon problem is of the form
Lt(Xt) = αtX2
t +βtXt +γt, where α, β and γ are time dependent coefﬁcients. Substituting this
guess in (A.1) and using the transition law of the funding ratio to eliminate next period’s state,




































































The coefﬁcients α, β and γ can be derived by substituting (A.3) in (A.2) and comparing the
quadratic, linear and constant forms on both sides. Using standard algebra this ultimately gives
the following recursive expressions, known as the Riccati recursions,


































Recall that the results of section 3 are conditioned on the assumption that αt > 0 for all t. Since
by deﬁnition ρ > 0, λ > 0 and θ > 0, from equation (A.5a) it follows that αt > 0 for all t if,10
(1+ρ)(θ +θρ +αt) > αt (1+kt) (A.6)
10 It is also assumed that αN = 0, where N denotes the last observation of the sample.
18In our data ρ > kt for all t (see table 1), so equation (A.6) is satisﬁed. In addition, in order to
ensure thatUt = Pt −P = 0, we must have β = 0 in the long run. Since equation (A.5b) is a








Again, this equation is satisﬁed if ρ > kt for all t.
19Appendix B Symbols
A autonomous part of funding ratio
B pension beneﬁts
D funding ratio
D∗ target funding ratio
G premium base
g growth rate of pension liabilities
h growth rate of premium base
k effective rate of return of funding ratio
M autonomous part of asset holdings pension fund
P catching-up premium receipts (% pension liabilities)
R liabilities pension fund
r effective rate of return of pension wealth
U control variable (LQR model)
W asset holdings pension fund
X state variable (LQR model)
α Riccati recursion of x2 (LQR model)
β Riccati recursion of x (LQR model)
γ Riccati recursion of constant term (LQR model)
ζ contribution rate (% premium base)
η smoothing parameter (PA model)
θ (discounted) cost parameter of premium rate ﬂuctuations
λ cost parameter of funding ratio ﬂuctuations
π cost parameter of premium rate ﬂuctuations (LQR model)
ρ rate of time preference (LQR model)
σ indexation discount parameter
τ catching-up premium rate (% premium base)
ψ indexation parameter
ω maximal premium rate (PA model)
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